Entries in systemic risk (23)

Thursday
Sep152011

The ECB thing

The inquiry:

This is what I've gotten so far... let me know if this makes sense. 

The gist is that the central banks of the world, implored no doubt by the ECB, intend to create programs to allow banks cheaper access to short term USD funding.  The ECB already does this but will now extend the duration of their loans.  One of the concerns the ECB is juggling has been the pending liquidity crunch in Eurobanks holding a ton of bad Sov. paper.  These banks haven't been able to access repo funding markets at rates that weren't damaging their already fragile capital levels (leverage was so 2007... right?... right?... oh...) so the central banks of the developed world have essentially colluded to provide funding at rates and durations at which the free capital markets would not provide.  I am not clear on the time frames here...

WWB response:

The ECB does not have enough liquidity or capital to replace the US$ liquidity lost by the euro banks… that to include the Euro and US repo markets; the ECD markets; the ECP markets; and the USCP markets (probably not available for euro banks now I suspect (hit CP GO for a look) or if it is it won’t be next week). One questions whether the ECB + Germany + France + Othereuro + [limited?] US support is adequate.

So, the US Treasury, Fed and few remaining semi- solvent euro sovereigns are probably funding for now the Euro Central Bank via some non-visible means like private gold loans or swap lines of various types or other undisclosed transactions, this a bridge to the unstated & unknown Uber plan… a mega GLOBAL TARP, a liquidity facility underwritten by undercapitalized sovereigns to prop up the Euro banks with no capital and a boatload of bad sovereign debt.   

The reason you can’t conceive of how it works or makes sense is that it doesn’t. It cannot work unless Germany, France and all the others including the US all play for size (recall the word “overwhelming” by Timmy G, you know the fellow who said there was "no risk" of a downgrade for the US?). You are thinking, "no way US taxpayers would support committing of huge amounts of scarce US (read that taxpayer) capital to such a venture!"

Consider that Timmy G, Fed, and Treasury are not concerned with that quaint notion. It is likely we're already in for size, such and duration to be expanded and defined later. Since it's election time, and Congressional inactivity is always a good thing, how about a Congressional hearing? A little transparency on swap or currency line usage or risk limits? 

Back to the ECB thing. This is the final rounds of injecting CTBPApynm (Capital To Be Pissed Away, perferably yours, not mine) before the euro thing likely grinds to a halt. 

They may have bought some time … a few weeks, possibly days, or months (who knows since there is no disclosure of the means, magnitude, or duration of the temporary support)… to raise capital for the banks which, if successful, will also be CTBPA. 

So,

  1. inject temporary capital
  2. threaten negotiate with Euroland
  3. hope you can get out
  4. discover you can’t
  5. repeat 

Repeat, that is, until the a) viable sovereigns (France & Germany & some US) go all-in or b) until you hear “BLAMMO” which will be the sound of serial Euro bank failures working their way up the collateral base, which will be insufficient. In the latter case, the losses will be realized by commercial entities and specific sovereigns to the fullest extent possible. Those sovereigns will then default or restructure because they’re broke and also have no access.  In the former case, the standards of living will decrease by a significant multiple of the unrealized losses. Think of that as a reverse, large scale negative Keynesian multiplier less further large scale costs for friction, agency, and corruption.

 

Thursday
Aug042011

Watson Wilkins & Brown, LLC, on the debt deal

What has changed with the new debt deal?

In the debt deal we had a large scale and global demonstration that there is a fundamental, costly, and cumulative flaw in the governance process of the US. One suspects that very few people actually understand the magnitude of the problems of our debt, unfunded liabilities, and increasing macro-economic drag of the costs of regulation.

I don’t buy the notion that the debt ceiling deal is a model of American republican democracy at work.  To the contrary: it is emblematic of the problem. We don’t know if we want to be a market economy driven by innovation and freedom or a socialist economy driven by redistribution of wealth. 

The markets know that and are just going to hang out and price in, every day, the continuing drag of opportunity cost and inefficiency, until we get the major question sorted out.

As it stands now, citizens shall soon lack even the ability to buy an incandescent light bulb. This, perhaps a small thing, but one that diminishes that Shining City on the Hill.

Won’t it save the AAA ratings? Are AAA ratings important to the US?

Let me answer your question with a question. What was the economic value of the enterprise of the United States three weeks ago?  What will it be three weeks from today? The answer to both is about the same as it is today, maybe a bit less, maybe a bit more.

What do we know today that we didn’t know before? Well, we know that Lisa Jackson thinks that under the Clean Air Act "For every $1 we have spent, we have gotten $40 of benefits in return. So you can say what you want about EPA's business sense. We know how to get a return on our investment…" and that this ethos, certainly not logic, remains a driving force behind our national policies that drive capital formation, investment, and employment. There are manifold examples of other continuing policies of the administration that are even more destructive of economic opportunity which we leave to others to explore.

We boldly predict the AAA ratings of the US will not hold because we have too much debt and a decreasing ability and willingness to pay it off. The ratings are largely irrelevant except as an indicator of long term economic & cultural decay. They may be seen as an accumulation of bad policy, bad political decisions rendered by the voters, and poor leadership over time.

We do note that even if we are wrong on the ratings call, we will be right in this ken: recall GM’s paper trading at junk levels in the capital markets while carrying investment grade ratings all around?  As a capital markets issue, generally, the rating agencies are irrelevant. They are generally behind the game and even if they understand the credit, which sometimes they don’t.  And by the way, aren’t the agencies regulated as deemed systemically important institutions?

The capital markets price credit risk every day. Go look.  Last count there were about 65 entities trading better in the markets than the US government.  Probably more today.

How will this be fixed?

People will vote in November 2012.

We have to decide whether we want to be a market & innovation driven economy or an economy based on redistribution of declining stocks of wealth. Productive people and capital will decide whether to stay or go elsewhere.

In the meantime the debt will compound, the spending will compound, the demographics of the country will age, domestic capital formation will stagnate, investment will decrease, interest rates will go up (barring another recession), and investors will look for ways to mitigate financial & regulatory oppression.

How will the market be changed by this deal?

I don’t know, but this is one of the few times in modern history when retail and large scale institutional investors may come close to informational parity, largely due to the complete unpredictability of political outcomes, the lack of enforceability of political contracts (will the SOB’s do what they promise?), and the now increasingly valid questions about the sustainability of rule of law in the US.

Try to allocate capital to create wealth in that environment.

Go hire a Wall Street law firm and ask about the certainty of senior secured creditors’ rights in “systemically” important credits, like Chrysler or GM or GE. Or compare the answers to “What do you think about the possibility of something big & bad happening in the markets?”  A quant geek will talk about six sigma events, kurtosis and the like, while Joe Everyman will say, “Sure seems more likely”.  Which can you take to the bank?  And meanwhile, some Wall Street analyst demonstrates complete dis-utility while bleating that XYZ Company is $.01 over expected EPS. No one cares.

No one cares because it does not solve the problem.

Is the debt ceiling deal good thing?

No, not really. In one sense it is very destructive because it perpetuates the language and manner of a continuing fraud on the American people … by that I mean the entire construct of disinformation where by common meaning and reference are inverted and no longer have validity.  Disinformation & newspeak are working.

Material liabilities are hidden, off budget, and off balance sheet. Taxes are no longer called taxes, but ‘revenues’ and tax reductions are not tax reductions but ‘tax expenditures’. Reductions are not real reductions but reductions from some fictional abstraction called a Baseline which has no relation to actual spending except to facilitate more of it.  Debt limits don’t limit debt, but provide a forum for an increase in debt. "Investments" are not investments, but political allocation of scarce capital resouces away from highest & best use. The government wants to invest in a high speed train, you want to invest in your kid's college education. Your personal priorities as to how you want to allocate your resources count less and less every day. Same with corporations, it just takes a different form.

So we are where our governance has delivered us. No one should be surprised at bad outcomes. Most know that if an entity repeatedly consumes rather than invests, it doesn't work. Or if an entity makes lots of bad, over leveraged investments over time, it doesn't work. 

More problematic is that no one believes the process or manner of conduct of the game is effective or reputable anymore. A friend commented “I don’t know what can be done to get these guys into reality”. The reality of the political class is different: they are in the wealth transfer business, not the wealth creation business.

They are in the business of monetizing their ability to dispense economic privilege to their preferred constituencies, the costs of which are huge & borne by all of us. They extract a variety of personal commissions in currencies that are mostly alien to those in the commercial world (extortions, soft emoluments of political votes or payments for economic privilege, power or other) and create macro costs that are huge & real, but kind of hidden.  

The target has always been other peoples’ money, but now the incremental drag on GDP and force of unsustainable leverage has upped the urgency: “I’m out of money. Give me yours.”

The target is other peoples’ money, and it is a target rich environment … your firm's money, your money, your parent’s money, your kids’ money.

Tell them no.

What is your economic outlook?

WWB are not economists, and we generally don’t fare well in any forecasting. But you asked, so … from our perspective, we just locked in a huge cloud of uncertainty across all dimensions of the US economy until well after the 2012 election. That uncertainty will be transmitted to global economies.

Look for nominal growth of 0%<GDP<2%, if not a few quarters of negative numbers. We expect employment will flatline, go sideways to nominally up, but would not be surprised to see that too go negative from time to time.  We anticipate corporate capital budgets will be trimmed, limited to only near term high certainty payoffs or strategically important or competitively disruptive initiatives. Emerging markets may continue to attract new capital investments on the margin, but that goes away in a heartbeat if corporations see uncertainty in global demand: “Who shall buy these widgets?” And that likely happened today.

So our takeaway

  • Liquidity first, long term investment second. We could be sideways for a while.
  • Diversification & risk parameters run the book.
  • Now is not a good time to reach for higher expected returns or yield ("never" is a good time to reach for yield)
  • If you think you have a good macro bead on what happening, you’re likely wrong.

Look for some more big volatility, perhaps some Europigbanks go boom and get nationalized … again … and then it’s going to get really quiet. Volatility will vanish, but it will be the scary kind of quiet, when absence of volatility indicates fear.  People will have their risk books tucked away. Volatility will drop because nothing will be happening.   

The Fed’s out of ammo.  The banks are out of capital. The government’s broke. The language is false. Prices are unreliable. Things get quiet during a rebuild.  Standards of living decline. It’s a grim business, and it's slow.

Where we go from there is the issue.

If you believe that the US will be a market driven economy, equities actually look good if you have staying power.  Private investment in wealth creating businesses (non-listed, low/no regulation risk) will be increasingly more attractive IF there is a restoration of rule of law, contract rights, and sensible regulatory costs.

If you believe that the US will devolve more completely into a redistributionist economy, gold, diamonds and portables look good as do opportunities in the black market. The alternative will be to join Jeff Imeldt on the President’s Council on Employment or get a job with the government. FDIC and FINRA will be hiring. 

I’d personally not bank on the shovel ready stuff: it might be a while. So the short answer is that we have to wait until the elections for clarity and then probably another year after that to even have a clue.

8/3/11

Monday
Nov022009

Nouriel Roubini on the US$ carry trade

Nouriel Roubini has an article in today’s Financial Times that is a must read: Mother of all carry trades faces an inevitable bust , excerpted below. 

So what is behind this massive rally? Certainly it has been helped by a wave of liquidity from near-zero interest rates and quantitative easing. But a more important factor fuelling this asset bubble is the weakness of the US dollar, driven by the mother of all carry trades. The US dollar has become the major funding currency of carry trades as the Fed has kept interest rates on hold and is expected to do so for a long time. Investors who are shorting the US dollar to buy on a highly leveraged basis higher-yielding assets and other global assets are not just borrowing at zero interest rates in dollar terms; they are borrowing at very negative interest rates – as low as negative 10 or 20 per cent annualised – as the fall in the US dollar leads to massive capital gains on short dollar positions.

Let us sum up: traders are borrowing at negative 20 per cent rates to invest on a highly leveraged basis on a mass of risky global assets that are rising in price due to excess liquidity and a massive carry trade. Every investor who plays this risky game looks like a genius – even if they are just riding a huge bubble financed by a large negative cost of borrowing – as the total returns have been in the 50-70 per cent range since March.

People’s sense of the value at risk (VAR) of their aggregate portfolios ought, instead, to have been increasing due to a rising correlation of the risks between different asset classes, all of which are driven by this common monetary policy and the carry trade. In effect, it has become one big common trade – you short the dollar to buy any global risky assets.

He's got the broad structural issues right, although perhaps stated with a flair for the dramatic. Timing & rates of reaction are critical for these kinds of things: will we have a moderate point of inflection or a herd stampeding over a cliff?

A stampede will occur as closing long leveraged risky asset positions across all asset classes funded by dollar shorts triggers a co-ordinated collapse of all those risky assets – equities, commodities, emerging market asset classes and credit instruments.

I'm not sure any analyst, including the Roubini or the Fed, has a clue, or at least a valid one.  My experience in the global markets has led me to believe that >80% of any liquidity (sovereign or otherwise) is determined by no more than 15 players, 3 of whom are seated next to the door, proximity to which is in order of cognitive ability. The other 12 investors are watching them. This is the stuff of which catalytic events are made.  The rates of reaction can be a little slower here given the scale involved and limited options for alternative reserve currencies. But an observer of grizzly bears knows that big things may look slow but can actually move quickly, particularly when faced with threats or a prospective meal.  Big things can also can grind quite finely.

Some have argued that Fed policy distorts a variety of macroeconomic factors including inflation measures, that nominal Treasury bonds less TIPS spreads are artificially low (I'm less sure on that one but am unwilling to rule it out). Roubini below argues Fed policy has induced an artificially low global volatility (although equities recently seem to contraindicate) with a tsunami of liquidity and artificially low interest rates.

The structural aspects do seem to follow a certain logic of unintended consequences that derive from the Fed's strategy of trying to manage excessively large and stupid concentrations of risk (i.e. "too-big-to-fail") by further aggregating and centralizing even greater concentrations of stupid risk.

Now, the question is, if you're the Fed,

"You're thinking...now to tell you the truth I forgot myself in all this excitement. But being this is a .44 Magnum, the most powerful handgun in the world and will blow your head clean off, you've gotta ask yourself a question: "Do I feel lucky?" - Dirty Harry

Well, do we?

The unwind could get a bit bumpy, but the point here is not to scare people but to help.

From from a practical perspective, what does this mean for investors? Our framework of bounded asset allocations, efficient diversification, and prudent risk management in many ways accomodates many of the concerns implicit here. Appropriate asset allocation is the touchstone. It is not only a measure of expected returns, but a matter of risk management. And if you find yourself inclined to changing it or second guessing things in response to market activity or headlines, stop right there. It doesn't fit or you're mis-using it. 

Rebalancing is critical. In broad concept if you've had a run up of some 80-92% in equities over the last 12 months (for example China, Turkey, or Brazil) rebalancing as a mechanic would lead you naturally to sell some of the rockets and perhaps lead you to consider some that have fared less well (US regional banks were off some 27% over the same period). Similarly, foreign small caps are up nearly 50% over the same time period while US large cap value stocks weigh in at 2-4%. The same goes for fixed income: emerging markets debt and domestic high yield bonds have racked up 12 month returns in the low 40%'s, while US short bonds have gone sideways. A rebalancing in front of the US$ unwind may not be a bad thing. Rebalancing will naturally remove the excesses from the portfolio, a systematic sell high/buy low (for many of us a novel experience).  Generally, this takes the portfolio in the direction you are intuitively inclined to go, but in a bounded and disciplined way.

It is very clear that now is not the time to stretch prudence in reaching for yield. Take the market rates and live within prudent risk budgets. Now is also not the time to run short on liquidity.

Stay the course with diversification. The corelations are in the words of a trader 'all kinds of screwed up' by virtue of the artifice of the Fed. It is not clear to us that anyone has an elegant solution to model and correlation risk (just ask the rating agencies), but common sense can go a long way.

Lastly, as an enterprise and portfolio matter, take a look at counterparty credit risk profiles and potentially embedded performance risks. Like it or not you've got 'em. For example, make sure you understand the operational risks of your book... like hypothecation risk in your custody agreements. On credit/counterparty performance risk I remain suspicious of whatever is highly regulated, complex, and opaque...insurance comes to mind....and for that matter Congress as well.

 

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